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CHAPTER I. 
1. Introduction 
It is our intention in the course of the development of this 
thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" 
constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological re-
duction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund 
Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. 
Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is 
to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and 
the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as 
the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical 
sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an 
Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to 
give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with 
their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common fea-
tures of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. There-
fore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall 
be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the 
phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of 
consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the ex-
igency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able 
to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as 
an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, 
how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. 
The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its consti-
tution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, 
if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, 
right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions 
regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of 
the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This 
we do in order to set the stage for amplification. 
First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this con-
nexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article 
of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy 
does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete 
and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal 
system; it simply has none whatever. Each and 
every question is herein controverted, each position 
is a matter of individual conviction, of the inter-
pretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. 
Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is 
a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the 
gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be-
. gins from the ground up with a foundation free from 
doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, 
wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the 
other, in accord with directive insights. 2. 
Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of gener-
ations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his 
was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 
2. 
'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomeno-
logy and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by 
Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 
2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 
3. 
the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the 
subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with 
his solution. 
The second question we have is that if the transcendental re-
duction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the rela-
tionship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far 
can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to 
intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain 
delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered 
is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What 
kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic 
which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which 
appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never 
see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a 
cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar in-
tentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? 
If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the taken-
for-granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure pre-
sentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. 
jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is 
not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, 
and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from 
whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental in-
tersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 
2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of 
Abstraction 
4. 
The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the 
conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More 
precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is 
the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seek-
ing is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in 
this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. 
That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. 
It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in 
the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable 
results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, 
though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines 
and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. 
It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lI eidetic ll 
priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on 
the value, in this context, of an abstraction. 3 
It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished 
fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to be-
It eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. 
But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 
3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h 
and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . 
rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this 
is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of 
this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and 
mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". 
By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we 
can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 
5. 
in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate 
grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it 
lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. 
The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. 
The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the 
poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective 
experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". 
This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense 
that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of 
that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a 
generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-for-
granted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we 
readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellow-
men, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is nec-
essary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This 
process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the 
search for an apodictic basis for social relations. 
How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the 
nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, 
absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be 
discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's 
criticism. 
3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to 
which it Gives Rise. 
6. 
Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate 
to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our in-
vestigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological 
view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of car-
dinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, 
particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly 
IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the im-
pulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent dis-
coveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific 
and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate 
in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of 
possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll • 4 
This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal 
science would include all the possible sciences of man. 
This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences 
might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 
4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, 
the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathe-
matical discipline. . 
7. 
it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philo-
sophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in 
fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, 
the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of 
the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes 
quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt 
a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, 
in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time. 5 
The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, 
radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience 
the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this 
necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the 
definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in 
the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the 
necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was 
searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie 
experience and render it pOssible. 
Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute 
ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of 
thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in 
acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite 
this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his pheno-
menology (and in many respects, closer to home). 
5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 
8 
But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we 
may vivify our theme? 
Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convic-
tions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another 
by prejudice: 
... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there 
is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be 
true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that 
not merely through want of thought or through levity, 
but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely 
considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less 
carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opin-
ions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire 
to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 
Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never 
completely believe what one believes. 
Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, 
which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a 
method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain 
some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. 
Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by 
hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judge-
mental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any 
position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the 
"sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 
6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., 
(Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 
7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomen-
ology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 
9. 
been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. 
What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive 
doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, 
or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, 
in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently 
this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding 
scientific philosophy. 
By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce 
the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', compon-
ents of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, 
the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' 
of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. 
In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of 
establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos i-
tionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at 
Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that 
hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the vali-
dity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question 
i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute 
evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexist-
ing tag~end of the world ll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the 
absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, 
along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive 
procedure. 8 
8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns 
(Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff. 
CHAPTER 2. 
§4. The Phenomenological Reduction and the Reduced Sphere 
In the course of the search for an absolute grounding for know-
ledge, upon which philosophical lines of thought could be built, 
Husserl was compelled to explore the nature of consciousness within 
10. 
a ·purified' sphere in order to assure his foundations to be ultimate. 
He sought, further, by means of exposing the invariant structures of 
consciousness, to provide an answer to the question of the·how of our 
knowledge. Husserl in this regard approached the problem in a decidedly 
Kanti an manner, uti 11: zing the transcendental moti f for fi ndi ng the 
a priori structures of our knowledge. However, unlike Kant, who assumed 
the validity of the laws of Newtonian physics and proceeded to under-
take hi.s epistemologi:cal i:nvestigations given these laws as facts, 
Husserl insists that if there i.s to be a true IIscience li of knowledge, 
the methods of that science should conform to thei.r objects. 9 Pheno-
menology, Husserl ·believed, is just such a science. 
Phenomenology is a science based upon the inherent Uintentional ll 
nature of consciousness. At this point we shall consider it sufficient 
merely to say that "intentionality" refers to the directedness of con-
sci.ousness. to and from its object, which is a result of the fact that 
consciousness by defini:t;:on is consciousness of some object or other. 
9rt should be noted that Husserl intends that this principle 
be adhered to regardless of the "science\' i.n question, be i.t socio-
log;: ca 1, anthropo li gi.'cal, economi ca 1, etc. 
11. 
The introduction of this concept now is necessary, as this ;s an 
operating principle in the course of our deliberations. The full mean-
ing and significance of this term will become clearer as we proceed, 
indeed, a certain degree of self-explication by the function to which 
the term refers is unavoidable. 
Intentionality is considered by Husserl to be an absolute legiti-
mati ng foundation for the sci ence of mental 1 ife, which aims at spell-
ing out the possibilities which can or cannot be actualities, the im-
possibilities which cannot be actualities, and the necessities which 
must be actualities. In essence this prograrrme is that of the syste-
matic unfolding of the universal logos of all conceivable being grounded 
upon absolute foundations. We intend, in subsequent sections, to out-
line the pathway to thi s "wonder of a 11 wonders II vi z., puretranscen-
dental subjectivity, as opening the way to the constitution of transcen-
dental intersubjectivity. We shall approach our goal through the use 
of the paradigmatic case of perception, to which other modes of experience 
relate of necessity. 
Unlike the epoche of Descartes, where the existence of the world 
is provisionally denied (with the exception of certain mathematical 
entities), the phenomenological reduction seeks rather to IIput out of 
play" the existential status of every type of conscious abject. Ess-
entially, this is the act of taking no position whatever with regard 
to affirmation or denial of a given object's existential character. An 
lIobject" here is intended as that broad term with the inclusive sense 
of whatever may be the topic of thinking, discussion, perception, etc. 
12. 
Therefore, objects in this sense are anything which is given to con-
sciousness through an act or acts of consciousness and as such mayor 
may not be perceptual in character. It is the goal of phenomenology 
to give an account of objects of every type, and each with its essential 
and appropriate objectivity in terms of the knowing. subject. Each ob-
ject is characterized as being in some manner "typified", and this 
typification reflects the level of being which belongs to the object. 
This "level of beingll is defined by the "ontic region" to which each 
type of object belongs. It is imperative that each object be grasped 
in the most originary manner of presentation possible in any given 
region of objectivity. We can see, for example, that the Statute of 
Liberty may be viewed in visual perception under various circumstances, 
or conditions of presentation, e.g., at night, at high noon on a clear 
day, through a di:rty window, in a fog, etc., clearly, the optimum con-
ditions for viewing the statue '~s defined (relatively) by the second case. 
And so on wtth other types of objects: 
Suppose I want to discover the originary presentation of 
either a lighter or of mental life. What I would not do, 
forthwith," can be instructive. I would hardly proceed to 
mow my lawn, get a haircut, build a boat, in order to obtain 
an originary encounter with that cul tural-practicallnstru-
ment, 'lighter'. Nor would I si'mply si't and 'look' at it, 
or touch it etc. I would use it, for just this mode of its 
being presented to (experienced by) me as tool is the ori-
ginary mode for that noematic character-. I'fIwere interested 
. in its color, however, no amount of use would as such be 
relevant; only looking at it under as optimal conditions as 
possible would do. Similarly for mental life: to have it 
directly presented under the best possible circumstances, 
I must not go swimming, drink tea, fly kites and so on, 
but turn to the 'thing itself' in the way through which 
it is itself presented, and experienced directly.,..,.reflection.10 
10Richard Zaner, TheWayef Phenomenology, (New York; Pegasus, 1970) 
p. 143. 
13 
The phenomenological reduction rives the integration of con-
sciousness into the real world as one. among many other mundane spheres, 
rendering consciousness no longer a property of the world dependent 
functionally upon events i.n that world. If consciousness can be con-
sidered unique after the reduction, and therefore possess an absolute 
logical priority with regards to experience, then consciousness is 
seen as a "medium of access to whatever exists and is' valid. 1111 
With the i:nvocati.on of the phenomenological reduction, the exis-
tence of the world and its contents are not denied, these contents are 
not simply straightforwardly accepted as existing, but are reduced to 
phenomena presenting thems.elve.sas thtsor .that. These phenomena can 
have their exi,stential character attached only insofar as they preserilt 
themselves to consciousness as existing. These phenomena are intended 
, thus as meaning that which attaches Hsel f, to them as part of the appre-
hension of thei,'r meaning; therefore Husserl: 
"As radically meditating philosophers, we now have 
neith.er a science that we accept nor a world that exi~sts 
for us. Instead of simply existing forus.,.-that is, 
being accepted naturally by us in our experiential be-
l ieving in its existence ... -the worl d iis for us only some-
thing that claims being. Moreover, that affects the 
intra~mundane existence of all other egos, [so that] •.• 
naturally I lose [along with this] all the formations per-
taining to sociali:ty 'and culture. In short, not just 
corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding Hfe 
world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, 
instead of somethingtQat,is.12. 
, , 
llAaron GurwHsch,TheFieldofConsciousness (Pittsburgh: Dusquesne, 
1964), p. 166. . . , 
l2Edmund Husserl,'CartesianMeditation, trans. D. Cairns (The 
Hague; Martinus Ntjhoff, 1970), p.33. 
14 
The world, other men, and social institutions are reduced to the 
phenomenal stream of cons.ci'ousness, experienced by me as mine. In 
this way the interpolar nature of consciousness is revealed. We have, 
on the one hand, an act of conse; ousness, e. g., in the mode of per-
ception the act of perceiving, and on the other hand, that which is 
grasped by the act; that which is perceived. While we can concentrate, 
in the course of our deliberations, upon either of these poles of 
apprehension, these components of an intentional presentification are 
ultimately mutually irreducible. Every cogitatio, or conscious act, 
refers necessarily to its IImeant" object which comprises the acts 
content. 13 Genuine knowledge must be based upon the apprehension of 
objects as they show themselvestc)be. The phenomenological reduction, 
in thi.s way, presents a world to consciousness in a pristine state, as 
openly it itself. 
The importance of this is clear. In order for us to grasp the 
meaning of whatever object we are considering, we must shOW how that 
object· is constituted· in· coriSdousriess. Our ana·lysi:s then serves us as 
the clarifying methodologY' with regard to whatever type of object we 
seek to illuminate. Once we have accompllshed the detachement of con-
sciousness from the transcendent world, we have in effect reduced the 
world to a world purely as meant. Husserl describes the situation 
metaphori'cally: the ego in the natural standpoint is "interested ll in 
the world, however when the phenomenological reduction is invoked there 
l3Ibtd ., p. 33. 
occurs a Ilspl itting of the .Ego, where the phenomenologi cal ego is a 
disinterested onlooker" set over and above the ego of the natural 
standpoint. After a transcendental reflection on this "splittingll 
15. 
which also requires a disinterested attitude, it is clear, says Husserl, 
that lithe Ego's sale remaining interest is to see and to describe 
adequately what it sees, purely as seen, and what is seen and seen in 
such a manner ll • 14 
This gives us the distinction between the empirical ego, or con-
crete self, and the consciousness to which this ego presents itself. 
Obviously, it can be said that, as an ego in 
the natural attitude, I am likewise and at all times 
a transcendental ego, and that I know about this only 
by executing the phenomenol ogi'ca 1 reduct; on. 15 
We can mention in passing at this point, that the reduction has left 
something over to which all our subjective phenomena must necessarily 
relate back to tnterms of possibility, namely, the Transcendental Ego 
as phenomenological residum. This Husserl claims is the region of 
Pure Consciousness, something which is (necessarily) untouched by the 
active i.nvokation of the phenomenological epoche. 16 However at this 
point we are not able to enter i.nto the controversy surroundi.ng the 
existential status of the transcendental ego, and further, any attempts 
14r·b· °d 
_._'-' , p. 33, 
15Ibid ., p. 37. 
16 E. Husserl, Ideas r, trans .. Boyce Gibson (London: Humanities 
Press, 1969), p. 113, passim. 
16. 
to do so in the present context would be misplaced. 
After the bracketing of the general thesis of the natural stand-
point, we may say that each and every object which is apprehended by 
consci ousness, whatever its mode or nature, becomes accessab 1 e to us 
only through acts of consciousness which we are now actually engaged 
in (active intendings), or could now actually become engaged in 
(passive intendings). 
§5. The Perceptual Noema as Something as Meant 
Within the corpus of the reduced sphere objects are presented to 
consciousness as objects which have attached to them a certain meaning. 17 
These objects are objects to which the meaning prima facie IImaterial 
thing" accrues. However, the apprehension of any given material thing 
withi.n the reduced sphere must be characterized as presenting itself 
perspectively, that is, as a one-sided adumbration. My perception of, 
for example, this apple as'meant as existing material apple is nec-
essarily a one-sided state of affairs, and while I intend the apple as 
a unitary i.dentical material thi'ng, I am given only a single face of 
it; i.e., the back and the bottom are unavailable to my view. This 
one-sided mani~festation which relates back to the transcendent,J.material 
thtng is the perceptual.noema, which, properly speaking" is the meaning 
of the perceptiona~ such just as it lies immanent in the experience. 18 
l7We are here confining ourselves to the example of visual perception. 
18Husserl, ldea~ I, p. 258. 
17. 
We can see that there is an open-ended multiplicity of perceptual 
noemata for any given material thing, and this material thing presents 
i tse 1 f through a mu ltip 1 iei ty of noema ta as be; ng mea nt by those 
noemata. However, while any single noema refers to the self-identical 
material thing in terms of meaning, it can in no way be considered as 
the identical 'real! thing, for successive noemata present themselves 
as distinguishable. If each noema~ or one sided presentation of an 
object were identified with the material thing, we would have as many 
material things as we had perspectival views of what is intended as 
unitarily i.dentical, which is absurd. While a multiplicity of acts 
yielding different aspects of the same thing refer to one identical 
object, these noemata can differ insofar as their content is concerned. 
On the other hand a single noema can be 'had ' through a multiplicity 
of acts temporally separated. It is possible to illustrate this by 
citing the example of one intending the same object but blinking ones 
eyes while doing so. 
In the Logical· Investigation_s., Husserl distinguishes between the 
how and the what of that which is intended. He uses the terms "qua 1 i tyll 
and IImatter", respectively i.n the first case (is it remembered, or 
imagined, or seen); and in the latter, what actually is presented. 
Later Husserl translates these terms into 'the character of percepti-
vity', which, like quality, describes the mode of givenness in a pre-
sentation; and the icentral noematic nucleus', which defines the content 
of the mode. It can be clearly seen that while there is a mutual de-
pendency between these two concepts, one can be altered greatly without 
18. 
affecting the other. To i.llustrate; I see (mode) this enteric beggar 
(noematic core);' I remember thi.s enteric beggar; 1 imagine this enteric 
beggar; and so on. In each'of these cases the character of percep-
tivity has been altered, but the central noematic nucleus has remained 
the same as re.ferring to a specific enteric beggar. Likewise, I am 
able to alter the central noematic nucleus at will within any given 
mode, e.g., I see this house,l see thi's tree, etc. 
The perceptual noema has'a status in the ideal realm, existing 
on a plane along with meaning in general, void of temporal and spatial 
characteristics: 
The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is 
as different as it can be from thiS'terceiVed tree as 
such, which as perceptual meaning be ongs to tt1ePer-
ception,and that inseparably. The tree plain and 
simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical 
elements, and so forth. But the meaning~-the meaning 
of this perception, something that belongs necessarily 
to its essence-cannot burn away; it has no chemical 
elements, no forces, no real properties. 19. 
The perceptual noema has no "properties" in the sense of properties 
of a material thing, it cannot be burned, dissolved, drop-forged, made 
into a vse, etc. If the object to whtch the noema as meaning refers 
is destroyed, one can no longer have a percepti'on of it, there can 
be no actualizable perceptual noema of it; but of course i,t can be 
remembered or imagined ,as appeari'ng from a certain perspective corres ... 
ponding to a way in which the object may once have appeared. 
The phenomenological reduction serves to bring to the fore the 
19Husserl, Ideas 1, p. 260. 
19. 
noematic side of consciousness. When we speak of an Ilappearance" we 
do not thereby mean to· indicate that there is a charismos between the 
appearance of a thing and the thing itsel f. The difference to be 
found here i.s the difference between a single component of a system 
and the system itself; An appearance of a thing is a single instance 
of a total ity of possible instances of the appearance of that thing, 
together which comprise the identical thing. To be sure, a certain 
amount of expectation or anticipation of future co-possible appearances 
through whi.ch the thing may show itself are at 1 east operatively at 
play here, and to this we shan return, however, what is important 
here is the implied ir'lductionof a self';"c6ntained·systemofpossibilities 
all of which presenttherilselvesto·be, to a greater or lesser extent, 
possible manifestati6nsof ~ singleidenticalthing~ and together deter-
mine that thing. 
§6. Ideation and the Appresentatfonal Function of Consciousness 
The case of identical meanings in numerically distinct positings 
leads Husserl to the problem of universals. We recall that phenomeno-
logy is intended to be the study of the general essence of consci.ous .. 
ness, along with its multiple structures, all of whi.ch presupposes the 
conception of general essences. Gene.ral essences, for example lIextended 
things", are given only as a foundation of the apprehension of parti-
cular examples: 
it is certain that no essential intuition is possible 
without the free possibility of directing one's glance 
to an individual 'counterpart and shaping an example, just as contrariwise no individual intuition is possible 
without the free possibility of carrying out an act 
of ideation and therein directing one's glance upon 
the corresponding essence which exemplifies something 
individually visible. 20. 
20. 
Phenomenology as an eidetic science of consciousness is based upon 
determini:ng the generic types, as opposed to factual particulars, and 
requires no necessary reliance upon any factual states of affairs in 
order to validate or invalidate its findi:ngs. The results of the 
eidetic sciences are 'in no way dependent on factual matters regardless 
of type but make assertions only concerning ideal possibilities, sub 
speCie aeternitatis. There is no necessary relationship, therefore, 
between eidetic assertions and their mutual interconnexions as system 
of possibility and actual experience, however, all experience must 
conform to the generic conditions of possibility for any experience as 
revealed through eidetic relations. Whfch is to say that the possibil-
ities of actual experience participate in the relations of ideal ex-
perience, but one need not study factual experience in order to have 
these ideal relations revealed. 
We we have stated previously,2l the objects of consciousness fall 
into a clearly defined region of typicality. The essence of each region 
has associated with it a specific regionaleidos which determines the 
20Husserl, Ideas, 1.. p. 56. 
21See page 14 supra. 
2l. 
axiomatic relationships and categories which define the ~ priori 
structures common to all types of objects which fall under the regional 
ontology associated with any given eidos. For example, under the 
regional eidos IImaterial thingll: 
IIRegional ontologies ll are, for example, geometry, 
considered as geometry of space, and not yet under 
the formalized idea of IIEuclidean manifold ll , and the 
different branches of mathematical physics such as 
kinematics and analytical dynamics. 22. 
We are concerned here, according to Husserl, with the IIconditions of 
pure possibilityll, viz., those laws which reveal themselves to be valid 
universal generalities, and as such are 'previous' to all factual 
states of affairs: 
Every actuality given in experience, and judged by 
the thinking founded on experience, is subject insofar 
as the correctness of such judgements are concerned, 
to the unconditional norm that it must first conform 
with all the a priori IIc'onditions of possible experience ll 
and the possible thinking of such experience: that is, 
with the conditions of its pure possibility, its rep-
resentability and positability as the objectivity of a 
uniformly identical sense. 23. 
The question remains as to how we go about gaining access to 
these el~detic rel ations given that factual matters have no val idating 
function with regard to the .! priori structures which we are looking 
for. For this Husserl uses the method of IIfree imaginative variation", I 
or the method of lIessence intuition ll , which is the same thing. 
In the course of performing this pecul iar type of Uintui tionll, 
22G 't h ··"t 190 urwl sc , QP.. £.:L.; p. • 
23Husserl~Experiente and Judgement, p. 353. 
22. 
we must first imagine a particular case of a particular class and 
then freely alter it in our imagination. If certain structures remain 
invariant throughout our random alteration of the character of the 
object in question, we are able to single out those invariant structures 
as comprising the eidetic laws pertaining to that class of objects. 
It should be noted that the variation which the object in question 
undergoes should not confine itself to actual states of affairs as we 
are seeking the foundational structures of possibility. We can, how-
ever, consider real objects, but the real existence of that object is 
irrelevant to the performance and results of the process of phantasy 
variation as the only concern here is that of the form imaginatively 
taken as a IIwhat ll , any IIwhat" which is able to reveal ~ priori structures. 
In free imaginative variation a particular conceivable content, 
e.g., a cup on this table, cannot be isolated from the horizontal con-
text as though it could exist in no context. Rather, one can vary the 
context as much as one pleases. Thus we can only imagine that thi s 
particular content is isolated. 
In the case of mutual foundation, e.g. colour and extension, 
there can be no variability of one content without a reciprocal al-
teration of the other. Therefore, in this case, each contextual con-
tent varies according to the variation in its mutual content. 
Now, there are certain conclusions which become clear through 
the application of the principle of ideation. The first of these is 
the essentially appresentational character of apprehension in general. 
As was made clear in the last section, perception takes place from 
a point of view. A thing may be near, or it may be far, and as 
Heidegger points out, the relative proximity of that which ;s near 
23. 
to that which is far need have no necessary relation to measured dis-
tance from the perceiving subject: 
Above all remoteness never gets taken as a dis-
tance, If farness is to be estimated, this is done 
relatively to the deseverances (Entfernungen) in 
which everyday Dasein maintains itself. 24. 
The point which Heidegger is making in qtiite a different context than 
our own, is that something may be very "close" to us, e.g., the glasses 
on our faces, in measured d istance ~ but at the same time they may be 
actually, concernfully, intentionally further from us than the plane 
which we are watching land in the distance through them. 
Things are presented from a singl e perspective whi ch gi ves per-
ception a manifestly adumbrational character. For every material thing 
there corresponds a multipl ieity of perceptions, each different from 
any other. However~ each of these multiplicities, while different from 
endless others, agree with those others in that each adumbrational pre-
sentation is experienced as a perceptual consciousness of an identical 
thing. 
There is, then, an essential ins~ffieiency in every single noema 
which is discoverable via the application of free imaginative variation 
to the possibility of an imagined seeing of any possible perceivable 
object. Take for instance the perception of a cube; we find that even 
24M t' H"d 'B ' . d Ti J M . & E ar 1,n el, egger,elng an' 'me, trans. . acquarne . 
Robinson (New York; Harper and Row, 1962), p. 140. 
24. 
in the imagination our object presents itself in a one-sided manner. 
Further, by imaginatively "walking around" our cube we are exposed to 
successive "views", and we find that each successive view lI an ticipates", 
so to speak, other compatible possible further perceptions of this 
material thing, this cube. Each further perception from another point 
of view bears a reference to all other harmonious possible perceptions 
of that particular material thing. Naturally, the range of further 
compatible possible perceptions is narrowed as we being to actualize 
other views from other perspectives. The conclusion of all this can 
be stated as follows: The one sided view of a material thing in 
perception ~ this one-sided view of this particular material thing 
points to the single perceptions constituting further perc'eptions of 
the identical material thing. No single perception of a material thing 
may occur wi thout referring to further perceptions: 
an empirical consciousness of a self-same thing that 
looks Hall-round" its object, and in doing so is con-
tinually confirming the unity of its own nature, essen-
tially and necessarily possesses a manifold system of 
continuous patterns of appearances and the perspectival 
variations in and through which all objective phases of 
the bodily self-given which appear in the perception 
manifest themselves perspectively in definite continua. 25. 
The one-sided manner in which perceptual objects are presented to 
consciousness indicates the way in whi ch intentional ity passively points 
beyond what is immediately given: there is a "muHiform horizon of 
unfilled anticipations, ... contents of a mere meaning, which refer us 
25 Husserl,·Ideasl, p. 131. 
25. 
to corresponding potential evidences".26 Each component content of 
the perceptual process (pertaining to a material thing) exceeds previous 
phases through harmonious agreement and complementation of them. 
Further aspects are passively anticipated as an endpoint towards which 
all previously apprehended noema approach. 
That which the "mere meaning" which Husserl is alluding to above 
points to, this potential evidence, is imperfect insofar as it is not 
a now fulfilled or adequatedanticipati'on of further aspects of, e.g., 
the other side of this orange; and furthermore this type of expectant 
synthesis can never be completely fulfilled. Moreover, this kind of 
expettant synthests can in fact be frustrated, so that further evidence 
of aspects of the object either do not extst, or are different from 
what was expected (someone has glued one.-halfof an apple to the other 
side of my orange). 
§7. The Additive Coalescel1ce of Noemata into a System. The 
Open-ended Horizon of Possible Noemata 
In order fora series of conscious acts to become a single process 
thereby revealing a material identity, the noemata must be grouped into 
a complementary, and thereby harmonious and coherent system. However, 
these conscious acts need not be performed in an uninterrupted manner 
in order to be unified, just as the corresponding noemata need not 
present themselves in succession in order to be harmonious and coherent 
26Husser'1 ,CartesianMedttations, p. 61 (italics mine). 
26. 
with relation to one another. Unification takes place when the noetic 
acts actualize and correspond to the noemata. The noematic system 
which is apprehended in a continuously perspectival manner, and which 
~ priori sets the necessary conditions for experiencing a material 
thing ~ material thing is a paradoxical experiencing: while I am 
aware of the one-sided presentation of any material thing. organically 
and systematically synthetically this perspectival is overcome, such 
that what is experienced is not this one-sided apprehension of a noema 
pure and simple, but rather the identically constituted material thing 
~ the meaning this materi.al thing. One may in this respect (at 
least pri'!@.facie) say that Husserl follows Kant in suggesting that 
synthesis is a basic feature of human life. One might use the formula 
that a seeing is combinedwithatememberingwhich is connected with a 
past expecting andantici.patory future horizons which may or may not 
be fulfilled. Ther.e is, then, a constant process of identification and 
distinguishing going on. 
The process whereby we apprehend a material thing through the on-
. going process of distinguishing and harmonizing noema to accomodate 
further aspects can be enlarged continuously to include in the noematic 
system depicting the meaning of the material thing additional noemata 
added by means of anticipating or actualizing further aspects of the 
formal material thing, or by perceiving it from other heretofore untried 
points of view, or under varying conditions. Additional information is, 
so to speak, gathered about the thing which is integrated into the 
system of meaning rendering the system more and more sharply defined and 
27. 
determined. This gradual determining activity is, however, inexhausti-
ble--it is an open-ended possibility that can never be completely ful-
filled. There is always a hazy zone of indeterminateness which is 
left over: 
What is actually perceived, and what is more or less 
cl early co-present and determinate (to some extent 
at least), is partly pervaded, partly girt around 
with a dimly M?Rrehended depth or fringe of ; ndeter-
mi na te . rea 1 ity. I can pierce it with rays from the 
i 11 uminating focus of attention with varying success .... 
Moreover, the zone of indeterminacy is infinite. The 
mi sty hor; zon that can never be compl etely outl ined 
remains necessarily there. 27. 
While this could apply equivocally to the 1I0uter horizon" of a 
material thing, i.e~, those other material things which are contextu-
ally impl ied here with what Husserl refers to as the lIinner horizon"; 
that is, the inexhaustibility of knowing all aspects and attributes 
of a material thing with absolute certainty, such that the zone of 
indeterminacy would be absolutely determinate. This "imperfect pre-
sentation ll is always, and necessarily a direct result of the essential 
nature of thing-perceiving: i.e., that a material thing can only 
always be presented in one of its aspects, with more or less copresent 
indeterminacies surrounding this perceptual II core II , this core which 
changes according to the mode. of presentation whi ch in the course of 
changing points ahead to possible manifestations of the thing presented 
while retaining past perceptions which coalesce into the unity of the 
27Husserl, Ideas; p. 102. 
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now actual perception, such that the "thing" evermore presents itself 
according to new aspects or by rehearsing old ones. 28 Further: 
the indeterminacies define themselves more clearly 
to turn at length into clear data; contrariwise, 
what is clear passes back into the unclear, the pre-
sented into the non-presented, and so forth ...• In 
principle a margin of determinable indeterminacy al-
ways remains over, however far we go along our em-
pirical way, and however extended the continua of 
actual perceptions of the same thing which we may 
have treasured. 29. 
Husserl claims that it is "logically possible" that a world 
transcendent to experience really exists inaccessable to human compre-
hension. However, he frames a controversy concerning the kinds of 
evidence necessary to ground such an assumption. 3D TMs controversy 
revolves about the actual apprehension ofa transcendent object as 
it really~ through perception, "experi'enceable ... as the demonstra-
ble unity of its systematic experience". But Husserl claims that a 
world experienceable beyond the world given in actual experience is 
"non-sense ll • To be sure, the apprehension of a transcendent object, 
or, i.f you will, a !;thing in ... itself'would involve necessarily the 
experiencing of the totality of the objectallatence, whi:ch contra-
dicts the for.egotng delineation of the ! Erleri reasons why no single 
percepti.on is able to reveal the thtng determined exhaustively·enbloc. 
28Id · eas, p. 137. 
29Ibid • , p. 138. 
30Ideas, p. l49ff. 
§8. Transition to Act Orientation, the Impulse of 
Transcendentalism 
29. 
Throughout the previous sections we have confined ourselves pri-
marily to a single pole of the perceptual process (as the paradigm of 
any conscious process), that is, the appearance of an object along with 
its meaning as conveyed by this appearance. We must remember that a 
IIturn toward the object", with which we:have busied ourselves, implies 
a correlative ilturn toward the subject", These two structures of con-
scious apprehension are inextricably caught up with one another, and 
further, are mutually irreducable. The problems which concern this 
parallelism between the structures of revealed objective referents and 
the many acts which apprehend them are transcendental problems. These 
problems seek to found the object in the acts and come to grips with 
the correlation between subject and object. 
We propose at this point to make our subjective turn after some 
preliminary material and, so to speak, discover the truth which "in 
interiore homine habitat. 1131 To do this we shall examine the noeti c 
si.de of consciousness which will lead the way to constitution in genera1. 
31CarterianMeditations, p. 157 (Augustine as quoted by Husserl 
from De-Vera Religione.) 
CHAPTER III. 
§ 9. TheJ~assive Co-determining contents of Noematic Sense in 
Thing-perception 
30", 
In the end of the previous chapter we discussed the continual 
refinement in the determination of the meaning which accrues to an 
object as more and more manifestations of the object are combined with 
the system of previous harmonious perceptions of the object. At this 
juncture we wish to bring more carefully to 1 ight the meaning of 
"inner horizon,1I which, in the appresentational nature of consciousness, 
the object in its singlenoema points, through meaning, to further de-
terminations of the object either anticipated or remembered. These 
co-present determinations, which, so to speak, "define" for us the ob-
ject as we apprehend it, comprise the system whi ch is the meaning of 
the object just as it presents i'tself. 
When, sitting here at our desk, we hear a sound, it is immediately 
apprehended as that sound ematted by a propeller-driven airplane. Fur-
ther, hazy though it may be, an image of a plane can be made more or 
less clear to us, even though the sound is the only manifestation per-
ce.ived by us. The plane is large or it is small, i.t has one, two, or 
four engines; the wings are above or below; the landing wheels are out 
or retracted. Now while it is not necessary for me to experience this 
kind of vague i:magery in order to identify the sound as that belong1ng 
to a plane, I can, and often do, form an image of the plane and several 
of its co-present determinaUons even though they are decidedly not 
31. 
visually perceived. These constituents of the plane indeed contribute 
to the meaning bestowed upon the sound and aid us in projects regard-
ing the object. However, in the common pale of perceptual circum-
stance no images will arise and the sound will be experienced as simply 
"pl ane in general" with the co-determining constituents passively ex-
perienced as images which merely could be presented as the object of 
an appresentational act related to the sound. Husserl: 
The individual thing in perception has meaning 
only through an open horizon of IIpossible per-
ceptions ll , insofar as what is actually perceived 
"pointsll to a systematic multiplicity of all 
possible exhibitings belonging to it harmoniously. 32. 
In most cases appresentational expectation and pointing will be 
towards typical structures of the object, in our example, the general 
lines of a plane, and not to the colour or exact wing shape. 
We are not, however, indicating that an object can be apprehended 
through a single perception; the single perception merely provides the 
core toward which determinateness, of varying degrees dependent upon 
the familiarity one has with the object, gravitates. In all cases 
there must be some appresentationa 1 functi.on in every presentation, 
i.e., the given perception must always be able to point to other aspects 
of the object; to assume otherwise would deny our previous conclusion 
that the perception never coincides with the object. 
32Husserl, Cfisis, p. 162. 
§ 10. Transiti.on to Noetic Analysts; the Concepts of "Hyle" 
and "Noesis'l • Conflict and Doubt. The Problem of 
Non-inherent Organisation of "Raw" Sense-data. 
In a manner quite reminiscent of Kant, Husserl, at the juncture 
of his IIturn toward the subjectll makes a distincUon between a mani-
fold of diverse, pre-unified data, and the intentional "Function" 
32. 
which unifies them and bestows upon them an objective status. This 
manifold of raw data, whtch he calls Uhyletic" or "material ll data, 
include such high order general contents as sound, touch, colour, as 
well as the "sensile" impressions, such as pleasure, pain, and so on. 33 
These hyletic data has no meaning 1n and of themselves, and 
subsequently have no objecti'vatlng function. We are reminded, in this 
connexion, how the manlfold elements of the phenomenon in Kant must be 
operated on by the a.pri6ri pure forms of sensibility in order to 
achieve. the status. phenomenon as .unitary objects. Indeed, Husserl 
uses a simtlar notlon by introducing the objectivating and meaning 
bestowing acts. These acts are the "noeses" through which an object 
may become an object as meant in one or another mode. Expressed in a 
Kantian manner: The noeses are the operative functions which work upon 
hyletic data in order to organise it and bestow upon it its meaning. 
To simpli:fy: hylot are the matter to which noeti c acts give form. 
To be sure; Husserl leaves open the possibility of a "formless material" 
or an "i.mrnate.rial form" .34 
A fair example might be found in the previous section concerning 
33Ideas., 246ff. 
34rb o ,. ~., p. 247. 
33. 
the sound made by the airplane. 35 When I apprehend the sound it 
immediately has the meaning sound-of-an-airplane, as opposed to the 
sound-of-a-bird, etc. What is apprehended is not a mere tone or simple 
auditory datum, but rather a specific meaning revealed through an in-
tentional act. The sounds here merely serve as conveyers of meaning, 
meaningless in and of themselves. 
This revelation leads us back to our earlier discussion of 
appresentation, but also introduces a notion particularly germane to 
our theme. While the concept of the "organisation" of hyle by noetic 
acts is not Husserl's expressed turn of phrase, it would seem reason-
able to refer to intentionality's function in this way if only because 
Husserl does claim that hyletic data hold nothing within their nature 
which might give rise to this kind of objective referent rather than 
that one (e.g. the symbol: + could refer either to mathematical oper-
ation or a supernatural event). These "elements contain nothing in 
themselves which is intentional."36 The implication would seem to be 
that the same set of raw data could refer to two or more meanings, 
which brings into play the ever-present possibility of conflict and 
doubt. 
The doxi.c or libel ief" character of objects may al ter wi th a 
change in the mode in which the object is presented. Further, we fi nd 
that this doxic character is inextricably caught up with the nature of 
35Supra, section 9. 
36Ideas, loco ci. t. 
34. 
intuitional presentations insofar as the positing of the perceptual 
objects as real is concerned. To be sure, all "thetic" acts undergo 
conceivable alterations as to the force of the 'belief character which 
accompanies them: 
The way of "certain" belief can pass over into that 
of suggestion or presumption, or into that of question 
and doubt; and according to the line taken, that which 
appears will adopt the ontical modalities of the 
"possible ll , the "probable ll , the "questionable ll , and 
the "doubtful!! respectively. 37. 
This process of IIpassing over" certainly has no particular direction 
(that is, either in the direction of strengthening or weakening the 
belief character), but is directed by the continual and harmonious de-
velopment of the system of meaning which accrues to an object through 
a temporal succession. Gurwitch poses a remarkable example of this 
(which for our purposes is preferable to the one which Husserl himself 
provides in the Ideas): 
In a display window we see what seems to be a living 
person. The perceptual process develops harmoniously 
for a time, its phases in agreement with one another 
[strengthening]. Then, at a certain moment the further 
progress of the process is impeded [weakening]. We are 
no longer certain whether the object is a living person 
or a dummy. The perception of a living person is not 
supplanted by that of a clothed dummy. Rather, the 
two perceptions confl iet and alternate with one another; 
one outweighs the other only to be superseded, in turn, 
a moment later; neither succeeds in prevailing definitely. 
Throughout the conflict~ the same sense-data are exper-
ienced, but they are differently apperceived. 38. 
37 Ibid . p. 297. 
38Gurwitch, Field p. 270. 
35. 
While this example shows a familiar circumstance, and stays with 
Husserl's intentions, Gurwitch goes on to point out that there may be 
something wrong with Husserl's assumptions. "Confl ict ll , he says, 
lipresupposes something identical for which there is competition. 1I39 
Moreover, the implication seems to be that for a single group of hyletic 
data to yield two possible interpretations, the organisation must of 
necessity be imposed upon the group from without. The certainty factors 
imposed upon that data seem relative to some "true ll perception of the 
facts implying a privileged perception. 
At this point it is not necessary to go into the details of the 
IIconstancy-hypothesis", and, in fact, this path may lead us astray. How-
ever, it is interesting to note that Gurwitch offers an alternative 
whitJh may be useful in our ultimate deliberations. 
Gurwitch puts forth the idea that an identical thing is a function 
of a definite location in space rather than an ambiguous group of raw 
sense-data. Presumably, in the case of his example, if the group of 
raw data, taken alternately to be: person, store dummy, were placed on 
the sidewalk in broad daylight, the conflict in appresentational mean-
ing would cease, and the belief character would unquestionably become 
that of one or the other interpretations. The neokantian Ernst Cassirer 
would appear to agree with this lIidentity of location ll : 
In a purely intuitive sense, a colour seems different~ 
it looks different as soon as, taken representatively, 
39 Ibid . p. 270. 
it is moved out of position, as soon as it is 
seen not as a surface colour, but as a plain 
colour or conversely. 40. 
Hyletic materials are questionable in view of the programme 
Husserl set up for himself~ as well as the sense of transcendental 
constitution which he wished to bring about. Unlike Kant, to whom 
36. 
the constitution of an object was a static affair describing the 
structure of objects presented to intuition, Husserl desired to arrive 
at a notion of constitution which would reveal the creative process 
whereby transcendental subjectivity bui1ds each of its objects, each 
wi th its own static constituti.on. 41 
The existence of such hyletic material '0' involves 
of course the dependence of transcendental consti-
tution on factors independent of the ego ... preserving 
at least a strong reali.stic element in the very heart 
of constitutive phenomenology. 42. 
In order to come to grips with constitution as an active and 
changing process, we must focus our attention on the noetic acts of in-
tentionality as well as the terminal pole of all such acts, viz., the 
transcenden ta 1 ego. 
§ 11. Reciprocity of Noesis and Noema; Sufficient Transcendental 
Conditions for the Existence of Material Things 
Noematically objects present themselves one-sidedly, however, on 
40Ernst Cassirer, ThePhiloso 
Phenomeno logy of Knowl e"d-'ge-l;;-" ,-'-'-;'t-'-r""""n"'-s "'-'. --i:i"---i':-'-;~:;:;.c.:..-r..:::.-.:..-i+-=-
liThe 
Press, 
1957), p.136. 
41 H. Spiegelberg, The·Phenomenological 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 146ff. 
42 Loc .. cit. 
Movement Vol. I, (2nd ed.; 
the side of the act, that is, noetically, there is a corresponding 
function to the interdependent possible perceptions of the object. 
These are the appresentationalacts of retention and expectation. 
These are anticipatory acts which point beyond to aspects of the ob-
ject not given in the present perception. 
37. 
These anticipations are not completely vague pointing to any 
kind of future perception of the object whatever, rather they are ex-
pectancies which adhere to the harmonious typification of past expec-
tancies which have been fulfilled or altered through non-fulfillment. 
Future presentations of the object are expected to fit into the gen-
eral structural pattern "hinted at ll by which is now presented and 
what has been presented. This is a predetermination which, while im-
perfect insofar as its inner horizon I s exhaustive determinabil ity is 
concerned, is determinate with respect to the general style: 
For example: the die leaves open a great variety 
of things pertal~ning to the unseen faces; yet it 
is already construed in advance as a die, in parti-
cular as colored, rough, and the like, though each of 
these determinaUons always leaves further particu-
lars open. This leaving open, prior to further de-
termi n i ngs (whi'ch pehhaps never take place), is a 
moment incl uded in the given consciousness itsel f; 
it is precisely what makes up the "horizon. II As 
contrasting with mere clarification by means of 
anticipative "imaginings", there takes place, by 
means of an actually continuing perception, a ful-
filling further determination (and perhaps determin-
ation as otherwise)--but with new horizons of open-
ness. 43. 
We find that there is a genui'ne reciprocal correlati'on between 
43Husserl,C~ttesia~Medttations, p. 45. 
38. 
intentional acts and the noematic manifestations of the objects which 
they apprehend •. Initially, our discussion took out of play the con-
scious side of thing-perception in order to investigate the ~ priori 
structures of any kind of object which is to be presented under the 
heading "material thing". Now, we have disengaged this noematic 
concern and have turned toward the acts which grasp the noema. We 
discove.r by taking thts turn that the s5ngl e perceptions, by which a 
material thing announces itself being related as static interdependent 
constituents of the object, have a noetic. equivalent in the function 
of pointing beyond what is now actually given through expectancy and 
anticipation. Further, when these expectancies of other constituents 
of the object are fulfilledhannoniously we have arrived at the point 
of the sufficient transcendental conditi.ons whereby a material thing 
may be taken as existing. 
§ 12. The Results of Our Perceptual Investigations, and Their 
Extension~ Transcendental Constitution. Transcendental 
Clues 
We have laid out the condi.ti.ons for material identity as a syn-
thetic interaction between noesis and noema. The act of identification 
is, furthermore, lithe fundamental form of synthesis. 1,44 
Husserl distinguishes between internal time and objective time; 
the former referring to the temporali.'ty associated with all subjective 
44Husserl~ Cartesian Medttations, p. 41. 
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process:es, and the latter referring to the temporality associated 
wi.th the noematic object in the world. Internal time, the time asso-
dated with the act of perceiving, is the vehicle for the changing 
appearances of an i.denti.cal object synthetically unified. This unity 
i.s not a simple unity of contiguous impressions, but rather an internal 
unity related toa single identical ego in which the ··constitution ll 
of the object as self-same comes about.45 The identity of the object 
lI res ides li in the .ego not as a part, as .if a marble were in a box, but 
II idea llyll as an immanen t i. ntent; ona 1 appearance. 
The object can be grasped in different modes, but the conscious-
ness crosses the ltne between them all, and gives rise to consciousness 
of identity regardles's of the di.verse modes in which the object is 
intended. 
Conscious synthesis, to be sure, is not an isolated incident unify-
ing this object and that, but rather unifies the IIwhole of conscious 
life". Through internal time the stream of consciousness, past,'present, 
and future, are synthetically- unified into a single all inclusive 
coSito, the seat of all possibilities and actualities. 
We discover that identity is: the gtft of intentional ity. Because 
consciousness is made an egological unity, we find that it is suitable 
as an object of an all-embracing cognition itself. This is the act of 
contemplation or reflexion. The consciousness. of internal time makes 
thi.s pre-eminent unity of consciousness into ego possible. 
45[ '··"t 
....2£. £L. 
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We have explicated the way in which concrete objects can be 
known in perception. It is important to point out with Husser1 46 that 
the specific acts of perception provide what he refers to as "trans-
cendental clues" to formal universality. We can, in short, generalize 
our findings as to type and extend them to the entire range of con-
ceivable objects. Each type as a "material ontological particulariza-
tion" can be investigated in i'ts own right (e.g., resextensa, or, 
what is more important to us, animate being). 
To investigate these types is the task of transcendental theory. 
Husserl writes: 
transcendental theories arise that relate ... to 
human beings as such purely as intended in possible 
consciousness, and transcendentally as ... constituted 
in the transcendental ego. 47. 
"Objects" are all constituted within the transcendental ego as 
their structure, giving rise to a rule which determines the range of 
other possible consciousness of the object and still yielding an iden-
ti.cal object. 48 The transcendental ego is the sphere of possibility 
of all types of objects which are for me conceivable, each according 
to its type, region, and structure. Transcendental subjectivity is 
not, as Husserl points out, a chaos of admixed particular types; but 
rather an all-embracing sphere in which the constitution of all con-
cei.vable, actual objects are inter-related in a single idea, the idea 
47Ibid ., p. 52. 
48Tb· °d 
_._.1_0 , p. 54. 
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of the limits of possible human imaginableness. 
The ego lives as an identical structure throughout all of the 
ongoing field of co gitati ones, and in that way relates all particular 
objects of consciousness synthetically back to a single biographical 
11111 as a substratum of all conscious acts. 
The IIconcrete ego" is a monad in the Leibnizian sense, which is 
actually lIinll the process of intenti'onal life. It is the actualization 
of the egols possibilities. 
§ 13. The Appropriati:on of Our Theme: Transcendental 
Intersubjecttvi ty 
In the fifth of his CartesialiMeditations, Husserl attempts to 
set aside objections that transcendental phenomenology, by virtue of 
the reduction of the meditator to lIabsolute transcendental ego" leads to 
an inescapable solipsism. 
He proposes to respond to thi.s objection and others by systemati-
cally unfolding the meaning of lIal terego H in the transcendental sphere, 
in much the same way in which we have unfolded the experience of the 
perception of the material thing. He writes: 
We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into 
the explicit and .impl itit intentional ity wherein the 
alter-ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of 
the transcendental ego; we must discover in what inten-
Uonalities, syntheses, motivati.ons the sense of other 
ego becomes fashioned in me and, under the title, har-
monious experience of someone else, becomes verified as 
existing and even as itself there in its own manner. 49. 
49 Ibid ., p. 90. 
In the following chapters it will be our task to explicate the 
meaning of the alter ego from various points of view, beginning with 
the egological programme of Husserl, which is the fountainhead of 
subsequent criticism and expatiation. 
42. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
§14. The Transcendental Reduction to the Sphere of Ownness 
We recall that our first phenomenological reduction was to have 
confined us to the stream of consciousness, its processes, along with 
their abiding synthetic unities. We may properly say that these 
unities are part of, and inseparable from the transcendental ego. 
Now we must lay down the pathway, whHe remaining in the pheno-
menological sphere, "from the immanency of the ego to the transcendency 
of the other."SO In order to do this we must seek what Husserl refers 
to as the "transcendental clue" to the conditions necessary in order 
to experience other egos as such. In grasping this clue we must deter-
mine the ontic region and type to which this kind of experience lends 
itself. 
The best clue is found in the straightforward examination of 
Others just as we. find them in the reduced sphere. What we find is 
that they are not simply objects in nature, but apparently psychically 
governed from within themselves. Paradoxically, we discover them to 
be objects in the world, but at the same time they are subjects for 
the world, to the extent that 1.. experience the same world as they, and 
in fact an an object for them. We find that we have stumbled upon an 
intersubjective world, available to everyone. 
I must, however, adhere to the contention that if the world has 
SOCartesian Meditations, p. 89. 
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meaning for me, this meaning is constituted as part of my intentional 
life, unified synthetically and having its verifiability grounded in 
harmonious apprehensions. 
In order that we may follow our programme, according to Husserl, 
at this juncture we must perform a peculiar kind of epoche; one that 
will bring into our phenomenological brackets all reference to other 
subjects, i.e., the subjects themselves, all cultural objects, tools, etc. 
This is a secondary epoche with regard to the intersubjectivity 
theme within the nexus of the transcendentally reduced sphere. The 
object of this further epoche is to reveal the sense of "ownness", or 
that which belongs exclusively to me given the confines of my present 
"wori'ld". We are to abstract from others such that I "alone" remain,51 
This secondary, "ownness u epoche will exclude all synthetic effects of 
intentionality related to other egos. We will find, says Husserl, a 
"mirroring effect" in my ego, a reference to an analogue of the I-myself; 
a reference to an alter-ego. 52 
In the performance of the "ownness epoche" we take the approach 
that what i's to me pecul iarly my own i.s simply not-al ien. Our task is 
to detach the alien from the horizon of transcendental experience in 
that: 
A property of the transcendental phenomenon "world" 
is that of being given in harmonious straight forward 
experience; accordingly it is necessary to survey this 
world and pay attention to how something alien makes 
51Cartesian Meditations, p. 93. 
52 Ibid ., p.94. 
its appearance and jointly determining the sense 
of the world and, so far as it does so exclude it 
abstractly. 53. 
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What we exclude is everything which is "spiritually transcendent." 
Besides this the observation that there is a surrounding world avail-
able for everyone should Rot be forgotten, but excluded abstractly 
from any consideration. 
Now, by and through this abstraction we discover that the founding 
stratum of our coherent stream of consciousness remains; that is, world 
experience as such 'qua harmonious inter-relationship between noesis and 
noema continues, but experience of transcendent others, i.e., what is 
al ien to experience in this instance has no objective sense. Objective 
nature, experienceable by everyone disappears. Within this unexpurgated 
sphere we find along with the'objects included in it there is constituted 
an object unlike others, that is, my own animate organism, unique, to 
which r ascribe kinaesthetic motion. This is the only body in my reduced 
sphere to which r ascribe and characteriz,e by fields of sensation. 
"Kinaesthesis" becomes a central concept in the development of 
Husserl's examination of inters:ubjecti,vity. Indeed, later in the Crisis, 
it provides the ground for what he calls the "lived body" (Leib) in 
his exposition of the "l ife world. II The life world becomes more and 
more important to the form of hi's philosophy; Husserl comes to bel ieve 
that the world of everyday life is paramount reality from which all con-
cetvable philosophtcal inquiries must make the;'r start. 
53Cartesian Meditati,ons, p. 95. 
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The notion of ki.naesthesis revolves around the "reduced" ego I s 
abil ity to be both perceiver and the perception wi th regards to its 
own organism, governed psychically from within. These are active per-
ceptions which are described by an "I can" or an "l am doing," even 
1n the case of holding still. 54 
In the context of criticizing the Kantian notion of "sensibility" 
with regards to bodies in general in the Crisis, Husserl points out 
that the ego lives in and through its organism, and that the unity of 
the kinae~theses is what is at bottom of the experiencing of all bodies. 
Within the nexus of the sphere reduced to "ownness ", the 1 ivi ng 
body, i.e., that which the .ego g.overns psychically from within, is the 
only body which can, by virtue of its. kinaestheses, be perceived as 
living; "alien" bodies are capable of being perceived of only ~ bodies 
in the physical sense. 
All of the foregoing does not preclude the possibility of exper-
iencing what is other. Indeed, we have only distinguished between these 
unities which constitute what is my own as reduced psycho-physical ego, 
and the mul tipltcity of objects outsi.de of me. The differentiation 
itself rema;:ns constituted my phychic being. 
It is at this; point that Husserl asks what the relati'onship between 
the human ego confined to its sphere of ownness, and the transcendental 
ego as that which unifies and constitutes the "world,lIis. The answer 
i.s that by performing the "ownness epoche" and finding what is "not 
54CartesianMeditations, p. 97; Cri~is, p. 106. 
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alien ll we have found something which. is transcendentally secondary. 
For here, everything which is other is screened off; however, while 
what is other is distinguished from what is my own, a consciousness of 
it remains, and this fact throws the lIother ll back into the stream of 
consciousness with the sphere governed by the transcendental ego. 
Thus the IItranscendental ego constitutes ... the 'objective' world, as 
a universe of being that is other than himself by means of the notion 
of ownness, and constitutes at the first level, the other in the mode: 
alter ego. 1I55 
When we first considered the notion of ownness and gave it the 
sense, IIthat which is not-other II we were bound to a merely indi rect 
notion of alter...,ego. But to clarify ownness it is necessary to bring 
out its posiUve characteristics. 
We recall, from our relatively lengthy discussion of the conditions 
for the possibility of perception of objects in general, that if a 
particular object is grasped in intuition perceptually it acquires de-
termination and ori'ginal unity through a systematic unfolding of har-
monious perceptions of it. The identical, the core, fits in the ob-
ject's lI own ll determi.natlons. 
This is applicable to the perception of my lIown" ego. Husserl 
writes: 
I am given to myself perceptually as this ego in a 
grasping perception. Furthermore I become aware that, 
. al though not grasped before this percepUon, I was 
55Cattesia~M~ditations, p. 100. 
"already given," already there for myself contin-
ually as an object of original intuition (as perceived 
in the broader sense). But I am given, in any case, 
with an open infinite horizon of still undiscovered 
internal features of .!!:!y own. & own too is discovered 
by explication and gets its original sense by virtue 
thereof. 56. 
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However, by self-perception we do not mean to indicate that the 
ego is presented just as, e.g., an object is apprehended visually. 
That which can be perceived directly is that which constitutes the on-
going, present, living, stream of consciousness. Thus, sensu stricto 
that which about myself is discovered perceptively is that which is 
found in the living present. However, more can be explicated about this 
ego non-perceptively. Merely note that the ego is grounded in a more 
or less clear recollection of the past or anticipation of the future. 
The non-perceptive originary determination of the ego is found in possi-
bilities rather than living actualities related to the current of past 
retentive and future protentive temporality •. In short, I discover the 
horizon of my temporal be'ing, which is not discoverable in the mere 
perceptual mode. 
Up until this point, the most we could say in characterising that 
which belong properly to the ego as its "own" was by means of an expli-
cation of that whkh was 'riot the ego's "own". We can now say that that 
which is essentially theegols "own" is that part of the actualiti,es and 
potentialities of the stream of consciousness which is pre-given and 
immediate to the stream of consciousness. Naturally this includes even 
56Ib "d 101 
_1_., p. • 
the consciousness of what is not properly the ego IS lIownil: 
All possibilities of the kind subsumed under the I 
"can" or "could have" set this or that series of 
subjective processes going (including in particular: 
I can look ahead or look back. I can penetrate and 
uncover the horizon of my temporal being)-all such 
possibilities manifestly belong to me as moments of 
my own essence. 57. 
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Thus the sphere of ownness contains not only the systems of noemata 
which form the synthetic unities of material and eidetic objects, but 
these constituted unities themselves insofar as they are inseparable 
f h . h" h . h 58 rom t e conSClousness w lC constltutes t em. 
It is important to state at thi s juncture that the secondary 
epoch~ in effect restricts us to a kind of objectivity which 1 ies on 
a lower plane than an objectivity which is therefor everyone, and 
which, as such, can be confirmed by everyone. The distinction is that 
between that of an objectively transcendent material world and a trans-
cendent world which is immanent in me, i.e., which belongs properly to 
the ego as its own. This is the thing as identical thing as pointed to 
through harmonious noemata as opposed to an Identity which corresponds 
to that attested to by a concensus of perceiving subjects. We have, 
in thi sway, arrived at the worl d as meant as transcendent. 
The world which we have uncovered within the secondary epoche is 
that which is ~ priori to the higher order "external ll world. We are now 
i.nvolved in how this IIfoundingll strata gives rise to that which is not 
its own. 
57Cartesian Meditations, p. 102. 
58Ibid ., p. 103ff. 
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§15. Appresentational Transfer of Kinaesthetic Sense 
We have succeeded in disclosing, by way of our purified conscious-
ness, a stratum from which consciousness has been purged of reference 
to any other ego. Moreover, we have purged it of anything which does 
not belong to the ego as its own. 
It may be hel'pful at this juncture to remember that Husserl ac-
knowledged that the alter ego is essentially, and in principle, in-
accessible~ and that "empathetic evidence ..• excludes in principle ori-
ginary verification (Ideas I § 140)." Our problem then is to disclose 
the kind of constitution which supports the higher-order intersubjective 
life-world, the world which gives rise to the idea of objective nature 
and which as such lIinvolves essentially a "'harmony' of the monads". 
The Other is, as we have said, not given directly as originary 
evidence. The 'essence of the other ego's can never be given directly 
to our experience: 
If what belongs to the other's own essense, were 
directly accessible, it would be merely a moment 
of my own essense, and ultimately he himself and 
I would be the same. 59. 
Something therefore mediates that relationship between the ega of the 
other and my sphere of ownness which allows for its presence to be 
known and further, verified. There must be an intentional act, related 
to other intentional acts, whi.ch makes the ego of the other "co-present" 
59carte~iartMeditattons, p. 107. 
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with my own immanent sphere, something which appresents the ego within 
the body of the other. 
We should point out that this kind of appresentation is somewhat 
different from that which can be fulfilled in the case of the perception 
of a material thing. In the latter case we can verify directly that 
which we have appresented in the past, by expecting and by then having 
our further perceptions of the object conform to our expectations. In 
the case of the appresentation of the alter. ego, however, the expecta-
tion can never be directly redeemed. 
What occurs then is something 1 ike this: within the twice reduced 
sphere I am able to single out a body unlike any which present them-
selves to me, to wit; my own organism, to which I ascribe IIfields of 
sensation" and kinaesthesis. My organism is discovered to be unique in 
that it alone is the only body which can be disclosed to me originally, 
immediately as an ani.mate organism. Now, let us assume a man enters 
our field of vision. His body becomes part of the ego's own, part of 
its immanent transcendency, and given that my body is the only "animate 
organism", the sense of animate organisms WhlCh I ascribe to the body 
of the other must have occurred indirectly, mediateely; through what 
Husserl refers to as an "apperceptive transfer of sense." I ascribe 
to his body, as it appears, the sense of animate organism which I as-
cribe to myself; however, this sense is meant as belonging to the body 
of another. 60 
Unlike Descartes' theory on the perception of others (which we 
60Cartesian Meditations, cf. pp.109 ff. 
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shall go into at greater length later), Husserl's is not a case of 
reasoning by analogy, even though an analogy is involved. Indeed, 
there are other types of intentionalities which involve similar mediate 
determining. Husserl calls this type of mediate co-presenting "asso-
ciative pairing" which is the primal form of passive synthesis, in 
which two different things provide the basis for similarity. He will 
even go on to say that: 
Each everyday experience involves an analogizing 
transfer of an originally instituted objective 
sense to a new case, with its anticipative appre-
hension of the object as having a similar sense. 61. 
§16. Appresentational Pairing: The Associative Synthesis 
In order that I may obtain a body, as an immanent transcendency, 
upon which the sense "living organism" overlays by virtue of its simi-
larity to my own living body, the original from which the sense "moti-
vated by an ego like mine ll ; to wit: my body, must be present original i-
ter, immediately, or,· as Husserl puts it, "l ivinglyll. We acknowledge 
that what is transferred analogically, i.e., what is appresented, can 
never, as we have said, be brought immediately to consciousness. Were 
this possible there would be no difference between my ego and that of 
the other, which convolutes the entire problem. 
What occurs is always the result of an "associative pairing," the 
fundamental form of passive synthesis, that upon which other related types 
61CartesianMeditations, p. 111. 
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of constitutive syntheses are grounded, not necessarily belonging to 
the problem of intersubjectivity ~ see From the other type of con-
stitutive synthesis which we have spoken about, viz., identification, 
the synthesis of association is distinct, however related. It involves 
a mutual transfer of sense in a simultaneous presentation. This is 
the case where two seeings are similar but not phases of one another. 
In this case two salient data are presented to consciousness upon 
which an overlay of sense is imposed one to the other which is imme-
diately and passively intuited. Subsequently, a coincidence of sense 
between the two objects accrues to each to a greater or lesser extent 
(total coincidence being the case of absolute likeness). Therefore the 
meaning of each is interrupted in light of the meaning which is shared 
by the other, provided evidence actualized in one or the other does 
not hinder or cancel the sense transfer. 
Richard Zaner provides us with the simple example of two objects 
imagined on a field of homogeneous grey.62 A round red spot appears 
followed by the appearance of a square red spot. When the second, square, 
spot appears I focus on it, thus while intending the IIred square spot", 
the "red-round spot" is retained as such (as perceived already with its 
specific sense.) It is at this point that the overlay occurs: 
Remembering •.. the tendency of consciousness to protend 
operatively, its own further continuance as typically 
like what its past has been, we note that the happening 
62Zaner, Richard; The Way of Phenomenology; (Pegasus, New York) 
pp. 147 ff. 
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of phase two at once fulfills and fails to fulfill 
what phase one protended. 63.- -
The second spot which is intended tends to partially verify the 
evidence offered up by the first spot. It fulfills the expectancy by: 
1) being a spot; 2) by being red; and 3) by being perceived visually. 
The sense of the first spot is transferred and confirmed in the second 
spot, while the sense "round" fails to tnansfer, thus the expectancy 
with regard to this quality fails to transfer. Consequently we end up 
with two senses: the first round-and-not-square; the second square-and-
not-round. We see from this that if a body enters my visual field which 
is similar to my own body as "lived", then an association cannot help 
but occur linking the sense of my body as "containing an ego ll or "govern-
ed from withinll, with the intuited similar body, so that the sense 
"governed by an ego from within" may accrue to it. 
Just to what extent the notion of similarity can be applied to 
the relationship between my body and the body of the other we shall pur-
sue in the following chapter which devoted to a critical look at all 
this. Let it suffice to say at this point that clearly I do not per-
ceive my own body in the same manner in which I perceive the body of 
the other. 
63 Ibid ., p. 149. 
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§17. Harmoni.ous Verification in lntersubjective Appresentati onal 
Transfer 
At this point we may borrow the notion of "harmonious appresen-
tation ll from the investigations of the nature of the perception of 
material things in general which we have conducted earlier.64 
As we have said~ the bel ief character of the object in question 
(in this case, the organism paired with an ego like mine) is strength-
ened or weakened through behavior .consistent or inconsistent with ex-
pected behavior; the system of meaning so accrus to the object develop-
ing through temporal succession. Here the transfer of sense is based 
upon the experience of ourselves as psychically governed organisms. 
The experienced animate organism of another continues 
to prove itself as actually an animate organism, solely 
in its changing but incessently harmonious "behavior. II 
Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that 
indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present 
itself fulfillin~ly iri original experience, and do so 
throughout the continuous change in. behavior from phase 
to phase. The organism becomes experienced as pseudo-
organism, precisely if there is something discordant 
about i:ts behavior. 65. 
What can bemever experienced original iter, i.e., the ego of the other, 
is precisely what is not properly of the ego, whatever can be presented, 
in a word redeemed, belongs to the ego. The ego of the other becomes 
constituted in me through what is presented and verified original iter 
as anothermonad. 66 Husserl draws, at thi.s juncture, the comparison 
64Supra, pp. 38 ff. 
65 
eM p. 114. 
661bid., p. 115. 
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between the intentional modification of the recollected past throughout 
the continual verification of it, and the constitution of the other 
in the present via its modification qua a system of meaning in the 
present. In thi.s respect the other ego becomes a modification of my own. 
§18. Bodily Centricity and the Analogue of Position 
My animate orgariism is given to me in the mode of IIHere ll , that 
is, from the perspective of the space which I at present occupy. All 
other objects., in this respect, are IIThere", i.e., in the mode of occupy-
ing a space which I at present do not. H<>wever, due to my freedom wi th 
regard to the altering of position via kinaesthesis, I am able to alter 
my II here II , and correspondingly the II there II character of other objects. 
In the case of an llother's" body, that body is always IIthere" with 
respect to my "here". I am in principle capable of occupying any space 
1 choose, given the li.mitations of facticity, which I do not presently 
occupy, i.e., I can make any Ilthere" a "here ll simply by .going there. 
clearly, I can perceive from IIthere" just as. I perceive from IIhere ll , 
only from an altered perspective. This has been shown through our dis-
cussion of the verifiability of identtcal objects seen perspectively. 
By co-presenting the body's "here ll with the other body's II there II 
the sense of the .ego who' s IIhere ll is my II there II accrues. The other 
thus has the sense of other .ego i.n the mode of If there . II 
Natanson po,ints out in this connexion that: 
Within the transcendental sphere, the heres and theres 
are identical , and the attribution of bodily placement 
in the world is the consequence of an intentional 
process whose source is the pure ego. The other 
is not restricted in this way to a figment of my 
transcendenta 1 consc i ousness but is granted full 
objectivity in his interrelationship with me in 
what might be termed a transcendental community. 67. 
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While this transcendental intersubjectivity exists solely in the sphere 
of my own ego, the non-originary presence of the other ego appresented 
within this sphere reveals itself to be a complete monad, introjected, 
as it were, into my reduced transcendental sphere. 
From this bridging of two monads is transcendentally derived the 
community of monads which comprise the generic conditions for the taken-
for-granted intersubjective world of the natural attitude. Furthermore, 
the constitution of a truly objective nature as we have said, implies 
the community of monads with harmonious spheres of apprehension. 
§ 19. The Movement to Re-examination 
We have disclosed the structures which gave rise to the notion of 
the other ego from the point of view of our paradigmatic case, namely, 
that found in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, particularly, as set 
out in the fifth of hisC~rtesian MeditatiOns. 
While it is somewhat beyond the scope of our present work to delve 
into the constitution of society at large, along with its cultural pro-
ducts, it may be said i.n passing that the common nature of a community 
of egos is established out of the simple case of the relationship between 
67Natanson, Maurice; Edmund Husserl, Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. 
(Evanston: Northwestern Uni.v. Press, 1973),. p. 100. 
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the I and the Thou. Just as the primal case of the constitution of 
the other as·a menad constituted in me, so the community of others as 
community of monads are constituted i·n me. The extention of the problem 
of the constitution of a transcendental "we" based upon the bridging of 
the ego and the other is the source of problems which will motivate the 
di.scussions in the next chapter. Indeed, we are to ask if Husserl has 
succeeded in establishing what he set out to establish, and moreover, if 
the framing of the problem of intersubjectivity within the transcendental 
sphere is not in principle self-negating. 
59. 
CHAPTER 5. 
§ 20. Interrogating the Transcendental Intersubjective Motif 
By looking back to trace the efforts of Husserl to constitute 
transcendental intersubjectivity, it is possible to note a great many 
problems, some of which are quite fundamental with respect to his 
framing of the "probleml1, as well as his approach. Indeed, it is not 
without reason that we have used Husserl as our paradigmatic case. The 
entire question of intersubject;ivity's place and explication within 
the ever-widening battleground of phenomenology must necessarily bring 
the questioner back to Husserl's attempts, be they found successful or not. 
It is on this note that we shall embark upon posing questions, and 
indicating particular problems with Husserl's treatment of the matter as 
we have laid it out in this essay. An in depth, critical appraisal of 
each and every point wi 11 not be possible due to the 1 imitation of space 
and reasonable time. However, the problem can be framed in the context 
of the treatment given to the problem by other phil osophers. t~oreover, 
we may be taken to the fundamental point of disagreement among those 
who disagree. 
The most obvi ous question is that of the necess i ty of comi ng up 
with a transcendental constitution of intersubjectivity at all. To be 
sure, the apparent reason for Husserl 's efforts in the first place seem 
to revo1ve around a response to those who would say that phenomenology 
leads to solipsism. It can be pointed out that in the course of what 
we may refer to as the "first" epoche it seems that intersubjectivity is 
60. 
given, not eliminated, as one of the founding structures of the sense of 
psychic life. It is only after the artificial suspension of 
the hidden intentionality of the founding mundane 
intersubjectivity, and eliminating, by means of the 
[second] reduction, [can] the essential content of 
the world accepted by me as world for everyone ••. 68 
give the appearance of solipsism. 
This point will be discussed further in our look at Ortega y Gasset's 
analysis of the problem. 
In the second place, it would seem. that some of the clear, nay, 
apodictic results of the use of Husserl's method in delving into the 
sense structure of psychic life with regard to perception and self-con-
sciousness become obscured and compromised in his attempts at constituting 
intersubjectivity transcendentally. It is almost as though Husserl was 
forcing a square peg into a round opening. 
The internal dynamics of the last of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations 
leave much to be desired in view of his avowed claim of presupposition-
less philosophy. Particularly unconvincing is the idea that I transfer 
the sense which my body has for me to that of the appearing other by 
means of its similarity to my body. Clearly I do not, indeed can not, 
perceive my own body in the same way that I perceive the body of the 
other. Let it suffice to say at this point that I go throughout life 
without ever having seen much of my body, consequently certain perspec-
ttves of the other's body are potentially alien tome and therefore 
68Schutz, Alfred; Collected Papers vol. III (Husserliana) p. 83. 
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resistive to any sort of overlay of sense as in Husserl's theory, also, 
the overlay of sense between male and female in terms of a transfer of 
fields of sensation becomes problematic. 
We shall be discussing the problem of dissimilarity of appearance 
with the introduction of Sartre's concepts of the "corps pour mois ll and 
the "corps pour autre" in conjunction with Ortega y Gasset's analysis 
of the problem along with his criticism of Husserl 's notions of appre-
sentative transfer of sense as applied to this specific problem. 
We shall also ask after the proper role of the transcendental ego. 
Indeed, is the transcendental ego appropriate to the study of intersub-
jectivity, or is it a question-begging intrusion? Can we speak of a 
pluralit.l of transcendental egos~ or is there ipso facto only one? 
We shall follow, i.n this connexion, A. Gurwitsch's proposal of the possi-
bility of a non-egological theory of consciousness. 
Finally. does the failure, i.f there ;s a failure, of Husserl's 
attempts at constituting transcendental intersubjectivity render pheno-
menology as a whole i.nvalid?Moreover~ has/Husserl altered the sense 
of IIconstitution" after performing the lisecond epoche!l? 
§ 21. Reasoning by Ana logy and the Priority of Self and Others 
We begin our thinking about Husserl's conclusions 3 the criticisms 
of it, and possible a1ternatives, by returning to our ostensible start-
ing place: the thought of Descartes. 
What holds true for Descartes, namely that if thinking about 
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oneself is the meas;ure of certainty then lam the medium of access to 
the world, holds equally true for Husserl. This being the case, then 
how does Descartes account for other people? 
It is our i,ntention here to merely sketch out the general position 
Descartes in this regard and to bring into play whatever is deemed nec-
ess:ary. However, we may begin by remarking that the manner in which 
Descartes frames the problem is within the context of determining whe-
ther'this machine-like thing is. really a human being. In order to de-
termine this, a judgement is necessary. 
Descartes begins by doubting the si,'tuation in which he finds human 
bei.ngs; it is not inconceivable that they are machines. The point df 
departure, then, is doubt, I can measure the indubitability of what I 
see against myself. 
A "body" for Descartes is lIall that can be bound by some figure" 
(Second Meditation) and which can be moved by impulse. With this in 
mind, we may say that the body is a' corpse, with no' Uentelechy, II it must 
always be moved by something outstde of it. The human body, then, is a 
corpse with a mind. Descartes distingutshes between the philosophical 
way of viewtng the body and that of the natural attitude. Thus, philo-
sophically, the body is a corpse, the result of removing oneself from 
the situation. 
Descartes beHeved that what we have access to in the mind is that 
which is dead. It is only when we find a w,ay to consider something as 
though i,t were dead can we begin to understand it. The discovery here 
is that there can be matterwtthout spirit, the result of starting with 
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the solitary, certain, th,i:nking·thing. 
Philosophically, then, Descartes begins by considering other 
people as cadavers. But we should make clear (and distinct) that for 
Descartes I am not alone because I doubt the presence of other minds, 
but rather because I am alone to begin with. Descartes' task is to 
distinguish between tl everly contrived automata and human beings. 
Let us go through Descartes' thinking at this point: I am a 
thinking mind!l this I make known in words and gestures which testify 
to my mind. Now, another body confronts me. It responds to me in 
words and gestures. I conclude that governing the words and gestures 
there exists a mind 1 i.ke mine. 
This is an example of reasoning Blanalogy. I have overcome my 
radical aloneness on the basis of whi.ch I doubted whether an "other" 
can exist at all byreas.oning. Thus along these lines discursive thought 
becomes. the origin of the sodal. Through reasoning by analogy and the 
observation of agility I judge that the othergua other thinking sub-
stance is truly real, like me. Moreover, because he is an ego ltke me, 
he shares in a rational community on the basis of which I can say not 
only what he is, but additionally, how he is. 
However, what all this means is. that,qui.te simply,Descartes, as 
does Husserldiscoversothers oli the DaslSofoneself. 
By looking at thJssimple conclusion we may find an opening for 
our discussion. Let us begin by stating that there is a great deal of 
. . 
evidence which would indicate that the notion that we discover others 
on the basis of ourselves i.s quite simply not so. 
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§ 22. The Intersubjective Views of Jose Ortega y Gasset 
Gestalt psychology, which rarely examines the consequences of its 
descriptions, would s:uggest that there is a fallacy in the principle of 
reasoning by analogy. To be sure, the explicit result of this kind of 
research is that knowing the body from the inside out is qualitatively 
opposed to knowing others from the outside in. Moreover, the French 
gestaltist Henri Wallon conducted experiments which showed that the ex-
perience which a chi'ld has when looking in a mirror lead one to conclude 
that the derivation of cOJJJl1unity on the basis of the sol itary is wrong. 
Wallon indicated that it is really quite late in the child's development 
that the child discovers the reflection of his own body. In fact, it 
was shown that if one were to stand next to the child in front of the 
mirror, he discoversfirs.tyourimage and then his own. If this is true 
then one does not reason by' analogy. What would be true is that I dis-
cover myself on the basis of others. 
One fundamental difference between Descartes· analysis and that 
of Husserl is that Husserl introduces the passive constitutive synthesis 
whi.ch avoids one of the most absurd resul ts of Descartes I theory. This 
passive constitution permits an i.mmediate response to the other as 
other human on the basis of its generic nature. The lengthy thinking 
process necessary in order to assess the humanness of the other in 
Descartes leaves itself open to the criticism that in sudden encounters 
with people we recognize them as hostile or friendly by means of ges-
tures. The question i.s: do we ever react as though we place ourselves 
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in another's place on the occasion of experience? Inherent in reason-
ing by analogy is the idea that once I conclude that the other body 
possesses a mind like mine I must suppress that premise in order to 
arrive at an other which is indeed other; however, if I suppress that 
premise I do not have a mind like mine. 
Ortega y Gasset suggests that we may well be in touch with other 
people before reasoning by analogy. One favorite theme of Ortega (as 
well as Sartre) is that man has no nature. Man is neither a body which 
is a thing nor a soul which is a thi~g. Indeed, in no sense is man a 
thing. In fact if we are to speak of man as a thing at all he is 
neither a res cogitans nor a res extensa, rather he is a res gestae, a 
gesture, an event, a happening or occurrence. Not only is human life 
not a thing, it further does not simply confront things, rather it 
supposes and presupposes things. What human beings encounter is the 
difficulty or ease in dwelling amongst things. This existing in dwelling 
amongst things is distinct from other things. The reason is that human 
beings have something to do, things have nothing to do. For Ortega human 
life is defined by one's doing commerce with the world. 
Human life is not something given beforehand, it is a task to be 
performed, in which one continually makes one's own life. One's unique-
ness is not something given beforehand, so that, as in Husserl, we must 
peel off the layers and structures of life in order to arrive at our own 
uniqueness. This presupposes that life is already there. However, in 
Ortega that uniqueness must be achieved simply because one's life depends 
upon it. Life is making, not made. 
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Human life in this view is its own cause, possibilities are not 
pregiven, they are discovered through commerce with the Other. My 
projects are always made vis ~ vis my Umwelt. There is a freedom in 
that I am not fixed in the world; there can, in fact, be multiple 
surrounding worlds. Animals carry their surrounding worlds around with 
them, while man can enter into many surrounding worlds, even simultane-
ously. Possibilities to be always lie ahead of us, what we were lies 
before us. 
We are many things in the mode of 'having been' and that mode is 
always still alive; the 'having been' forms a gestalt coherence with 
what we are doing and that which we have to do. Accordingly, the having 
been of ones own life, or the life of a nation acts as a ballast on the 
possibilities which lie ahead (a notion clearly not alien to Husserl), 
even to the point of collapsing those possibilities, e.g.: we can no 
longer be positivists because we have already been positivists. 
All of my knowledge has a social, as well as a personal connotation, 
consisting of a system of usages which pertain to beliefs, academic and 
otherwise. (For a life to receive the stamp of validity, time must 
pass), The past is already a social past attesting to the existence of 
other people. 
In Man and People Ortega begins with the question: IIWhat is the 
social?" In responding to it he notes that the fundamental difference 
between man and animals lies in the fact that man is characterised by 
lIinteriorityli while animals are possessed by "exteriority.1I69 It is 
690rtega y Gasset, Jose; Man and People, trans. W. Trask (W. Norton 
and Co., New York, 1963), p. 17ff. 
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Descartes' discovery that man is capable of going within himself that 
Ortega is referring to, in contrast to animals who are purely possessed 
by what is other than themselves. 
The animal is pure alteracion. It cannot be within 
itself. Hence when things fail to threaten or 
caress it; when they give it a holiday; in short, 
when what is other ceases to move and manage it, the 
poor animal has virtually to stop existing, that is, 
it goes to sleep. 70. 
The ability to withdraw for man is not a gift, it is an achievement 
that must be protected and preserved. Human being, moreover, is pecu-
liar because one can never be certain if that inwardness can be pre-
served. Man, unlike a brute, is never certain of his being himself, at 
every turn he may turn into something else. 
For Ortega not only is the life of each of us unique and non-
transferable, but it already includes a presumed belief in somebody 
else--at the very moment the uniqueness is discovered, the other is 
equally included. In our "radical solitude ll we are only alone with 
respect to that from which we are alone. Uniqueness is inseparable from 
the notion of other people. 
The power of man to withdraw into himself gives rise to two con-
sequential extremes: intellectualism (contemplation) and voluntarism 
(stupification). The matrix which middles these extremes is sociality. 
IIRadical real ityll, that is, every day 1 ife just as we straight-
forwardly 1 ive it, is characterised by a Itcom-presence ll (presence with) 
70Ibid., p. 19. 
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between man and his surroundings. Ortega is concerned with the law 
and structure of Bnvironment (in the broad sense). In this connexion 
we find a close agreement between Ortega and Husserl. Ortega would 
say that we conduct our lives according to the rules of appresentation 
which govern the inner and outer horizons of perception (in Ortega 
"figure ll and I'ground ll ), Further., as in Husserl (previous to the 
IIsecond epoche ll ), Ortega woul d say that our environment refl ects a 
system of social usages. However, i.n saying that we are oriented in 
our uniqueness so that we are the broadcasting center of our actions, 
or, so to speak, the Hzero-point" of our environment, Ortega emphasises 
that we are each in a place where no one else can be. It is on this 
point that Husserl's analogical transferance of sense will be criticised 
by Ortega. It is this point that the next sections will be discussing. 
§ 23. Co-existence of One-another in Ortega 
In following along the path lai.d down by Ortega we arrive at the 
pertinent point: Uinter-indivi.dual 1 ife. 1I 
We may search our environment and come across many objects varying 
in type. Noreover.we may act I'upon 'l many of these objects. We can, 
e.g., "act upon ll a stone. We know some of its properties, we know we 
can grind it, break it, sink it in a pond, etc., but whatever action we 
tak.e it IIresponds ll only according to the action which we take ,- it 
"responds" absolutely mechanically. There is never a corresponding 
action on its part. There is, hence, a uni-directional relationship be-
tween the stone and 1, but always in the direction of the stone. 
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In the case of one's encounter with animals, the situation is 
altered. We find that there is no longer only a uni-directional rela-
tionship. My actions towards the brute already presuppose some 
possible reaction on its part. It may bite me, run away, growl, etc. 
This anticipated re-action on the part of the animal presupposes re-
action according to the system of meaning which such and such an animal 
inheres to in my experience. The stone is indifferent to my existence, 
to i't "I am not"--there is no communHy. However, in the case of the 
animal there is a reciprocity in the relationship; I am to it, and it 
is to me. There is in this at least the beginnings of a !lwe" relationship. 
At this juncture Ortega asks if the relationship of mutual co-
responding is not what we really mean by the social? In response to 
this we note that while, in fact, the animal "co-responds" with me, he 
does so with an exhaustably limited repertoire. Thus we must ask: How 
do other men manifest themselves to me? 
In responding to thts question Ortega gives a remarkable answer 
in light of the answer whi.ch Husserl provided. 
All that I percei~ve of the other is his body, a body which exhibits 
a particular behavior. like the animal, this behavior hints at inward-
ness; however this. behavi.or can never be directly experienced, or known 
with certainty. The body "of the other becomes a sign of inwardness. 
Thus while the body of the other i:s just object among other objects, 
its behavior points inward, i.ts "expressionll hints at inwardness. The 
inwardness is therefore appresented, made com-present with the flesh of 
the body. Yet Ortega points out (as Schutz and Fink do), that while 
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the appresented other s ide of, say, an orange, has been or can be made 
present to intuition the i.nwardness of the other man can never be made 
present as such. 
The body of the other, according to Ortega is an "expressive 
field u71 of something whi.ch may be immanent. Ortega notes that: 
the li.fe of the other is not patent reality to 
me as my own life is; the life of the other - I 
deliberately put this in loose terms - is only a 
presumption or a presumed or assumed reality; as 
probable, as plausible~ as likely as you please, 
but not radically~ unquestionable, primordial IIreality." 72. 
This fact, says Ortega, leads us to conclude that there are other 112nd 
class reali.ties ll within our radical, unique, primordial life. This is 
not to deny their real ity, but simply to state that there are "2nd 
class realiti.es ll not of the quality part-of-my-radical-centric-life. 
By way of an example of 2nd class realities, we may point out the world 
constructions of the physical sciences. 
From a different point of view, certainly a less cri.tical one, we 
conduct our lives as though the other man's ego is not a 2nd class 
reality, but rather as part of the paramount reality of daily life. 
Normally, Ortega writes, the other is much a reality to me as my own 
life isJ3 
We can say,then ~ that the other i.s highly ambiguous. It is both 
another Ufe like mine, as well as being absolutely alien to me. With 
710rtega y Gasset,~~cit., p. 93. 
72r'b °d 95 
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Ortega's theory we can point out three general structural moments: 
1) The stream of my own life in its radical solitude. 
2) The mine which begins with my body (what is not mine is whatever 
resists me). 
And most importantly: 
3) Pure and inaccessable Other, which, however, announces itself 
to me. 
Ortega agrees in principle with Kant and Husserl, who held that 
Objective nature is based on social relation in general in order to es-
tablish a common world for everyone, but specifically, that only with 
dealing with the other ih·~Ottessiva coordinate experiences, does the 
objective world arise. However, Ortega says, men are lIat one only in 
our vision of certain gross and coarse components of the world,1I but 
this is enough to lead us to conclude that there is one world for every-
one. Moreover, this means that were it not for the other's inaccessi-
bility to me, I would have no idea of what it meant to be objective. 
Only on thi s basis is there .any for~. Objective nature, in and of 
itself, presupposes what Ortega calls IIwe-ityll (nostrity). Furthermore, 
if coordinate experience is the test of objectivity, this may indicate 
that the usage is the most objective sort of thing. 
Let us digress for a moment to say that the foregoing discussion 
is a case of society being looked at from what Descartes referred to 
as the IIphilosophic ll attitude. For Ortega this attitude can be made 
only artificiany pure. The point is that we must not lose sight of 
the fact that for Ortega, in the paramount reality of daily life in 
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which we normally situate ourselves, not withstanding certain excursions 
into the realm of radical reality (where we are now situated), the IIfirst 
person" is always the last person to appear. In daily life, in fact, 
the life of the other may turn out to be more real than my own. 
§ 24. The Body as "Sign" 
Ortega writes: 
the only part of the other man which is actually 
present to us is his body, but his body, being 
flesh, is a field of expressiveness, an almost in-
exhaustible semaphore of signal. 74. 
It seems appropriate to mention that there is an interesting difference 
between the theori es of Husserl and Ortega. Husserl bases the knowl edge 
of the other-as-possessing-an-ego-like-mine upon the fact that he possess-
es a body which appears to be similar to mine (that is, as mine seems to 
me). Ortega, on the other hand, bases his acknowledgement of the other 
ego upon "expressiveness ll or behavior (in the broad sense) on the part 
of the other's body which responds to me in complicated, and virtually 
inexhaustible ways. 
Peripherally, Husserl's theory could not account for the appresen-
tation of an ego in a non-human intelligent creature because we could 
not effect anappresentative transfer of sense to that misshapen form. 
Presumably,Ortega could account. for this on the basis of gestures or on 
account of the pure expressiveness of this other's Ifflesh". We intend 
740rtega,~.cit., p. 117 ff. 
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to point out, in this regard, that Husserl's theory can not really 
account for woman on the basis of a transfer of "sense" from a man's 
body. 
Ortega criticizes Husserl on this point. Rightly, Ortega sees 
that Husserl's theory is based on an analogy; perhaps not strictly 
speaking on a reasoning by analogy; however, Husserl himself admits 
that an analogy is involved. Ortega goes on to assert that every ana-
logy involves a correspondence of two terms to two: 
In our case the analogical transposition would, 
according to Husserl, consist in this: if my body 
is body - flesh because I am in it - in the Other's 
body there must likewise be another I; an alter ego. 
The bas'i s of thi sana logy, the common term - common 
in the sense of similar - would be my body and the 
body of the other. 75. 
Furthermore, the other's body, according to this, is different from my 
body only by the fact,thatit is located there while I am here (a there, 
which, if 1 wished, I could make my here). 
Ortega s ingl es out two errors in this 1 i ne of reasoning. The 
fi rst cons i sts in the fact that because my body through its 1 ivi ng 
kinaesthetics is the broadcasting center of ~ actions, it differs 
greatly from the body of the other. There is no mere difference in 
perspective, much more is involved than simply that. My body is "seen" 
from within, it is my IIproperty", my attribute. This is to say that 
I apprehend my life - the withi.n is accessible .to me, the without is 
not - in the case (Iif the other the situation for me is reversed. 
750rtega,.QE..Cit., p. 123 ff. 
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The other, "scarcely smaller" error, arises in the case where the 
Other I confront is female, an other which "is not He but is Shell, It 
is unlikely that any associative transfer of sense could take place 
when the perceived other manifests itself as a feminine other. We see 
that the associative transfer of sense - the motivating supposition of 
Husserl's theory - is quite wrong: 
the transposition of my ego, which is irremediably 
masculine, into a woman's body could only produce an 
extreme case of virigo, but it ;s inadequate to ex-
plain that prodigious discovery, the appearance of 
the feminine human being, different from me. 76. 
The point of each of these two criticisms revolves about the fact 
that we do not know our bodies from within in any way which ;s similar 
to knowing the other's body from without. However, even if this were 
nd>:t the case, the other's body may be entirely different in shape, 
construction, and behavior from mine. 
§ 25. On the Being-of-the-bodY-for-oneself and the Being-of-the-
body-for-others in Sartre 
While the element of mutuality between self and other evidenced in 
the writings of Jose Ortega y Gasset can not seem to be found in Sartre's 
explanation of our Knowledge of others, his distinction between how I 
live my body, and how I vi.ew the body of the other brings our point into 
clearer light. To be sure, it is not our intention to offer any in depth 
criticism of Sartre's theory, but merely to extract, hopefully without 
760rtega, Q£.cit., p. 128. 
doing damage to the text, that which bears upon our present study. 
Sartre appears to sugges.t that confusing the body as it exists 
for oneself and the body as it exists for others is a direct result 
of holding on to the untenable Cartesian charismos between the body 
and the soul. The impl ication here is that Husserl, in hi's attempt 
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to refute the charge of solipsism, may have restored the separation of 
mi.nd and body, particularly when he asserts (at least implicitly) that 
the 1 ived body must be viewed "objectively" in order to initiate the 
analogical pairing process.?? 
Sartre s'tates that knowledge of the world is based upon relations; 
human knowledge, in order to mean anything, must be from the point of 
view of some uhere" and Hnow". Any simultaneous knowledge of the world 
from two perspectives by the same observer would lead to the collapse 
of distinction, orientation, and order in the world. There is a univocal 
relati:onship of things to my (Ihere u and this in an orderly fashion. 
Sartre goes: on to point out that the body-for-itself is the "sur-
passed" body in-Hself because it is mine. Consciousness ('for-itself) 
treats the body in the course of acting in the world, as though it were 
not in-itself, as the body i.s the for-itself's necessary engagement in 
the world. The world can be consi.dered my instrument, I cali lise it. 
However, if r consider my own body as an i.nstrument, I would need an 
instrument even closer to control it. The further evidence for the basic 
,integration of the for-itself into the surpassed body is the fact that I 
77Cf • Husserl ~ Cartesian Medi'tations, par. 54. 
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cannot see my eyes seeing, for this has no meaning, nor can I feel the 
hand feeling. In fact, in all of these cases consciousness ~ right 
up to the object touched or seen. In the relationship of the hand to 
an object being felt the objectivity of the hand is nihilated. I am 
it. Sartre puts it well: lithe body ;s 1 ived it is not known. II The 
body-for-me in Sartre is something overcome, something which I live or 
exist outside of. 78 
We wi 11 now turn to the Body-for..,others. Sartre points out that 
the body as it appears to others and the body of the others as it appears 
to me are tantamount to the same thing. The structure and meaning of 
each is reciprocal. Sartre goes on to point out that we do not learn 
of others on the basis of our own bodies: 
The body is not that which first manifests the Other 
first to me. In fact if the fundamental relation of 
my being to that of the Other were reduced to the 
relation of my body to the Other's body, it would be 
a purely external relation. But my connection with 
the Other is inconceivable if it ;s not an internal 
negation. I must apprehend the Other first as the one 
for whom I exist as an object; the reapprehension of 
my selfness causes the other to appear as an object 
in a second moment of prehistoric historisation. The 
appearance of the Other's body is not therefore a pri-
mary encounter; on the contrary, it is only one epi sode 
in my relations with the Other and in particular in 
what we have described as making an object of the Other. 
Or, if you wish, the Other exists for me first and I 
apprehend him in his body subseguently. 79. 
Clearly Sartre is describing here the sphere of everyday life taken 
78Sartre, Jean-Paul; Being and Nothingness (New York: ItJashington 
Square Press, 1969), p. 429, 
79 Ibid ., pp. 445-46. 
77. 
to be the "primaryll encounter with the other. What is interesting is 
that he implies that in order to view the other's body as such, I 
must suppress to some extent the egoic characteristics of the body 
(the concept of the body as encapsulating a mind is exactly that which 
Sartre is arguing against). This isa shift in orientation; the 
making of the other into an object~ which primordially (straighforwardly) 
it is not in an encounter with him as a person. 
The other is given as transcendence transcended. He is given as 
the center of the relations which comprise his situation. The other is 
never given as flesh. 80 For Sartre the other as ego (concrete) is 
given immediately; it is always already there. 14e are never given the 
other first as body and then as the center of his situation. Moreover, 
the body of the other is meaningful in relationship to that which it 
relates. The other's body is given as a "ground ll , meaning that: 
(1) 1 can never apprehend the Other's body except 
in terms of a total situation which indicates it. 
(2) 1 cannot perceive any organ of the Other's body 
in isolation, and I always cause each single organ 
to be indicated to me in terms of the totality of 
the Flesh or of life. Thus my perception of the 
Other's body is radically different from my perception 
of things. 81. 
To see the other as purely object (among other objects) would 
involve an artificial de~integration of the other and his situation. 
Presumably~ this would render the other meaningless and would relegate 
his constitution as alter~ego to the realm of the impossible. 
80Sartre, Q£.cit. p. 451. 
81 Ibid ., p. 453. 
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The body for others is the magic object par excellence 
Thus the Other's body is always a-body-more-than-a-body 
because the other is given to me totally and without 
intermediary in the perpetual surpassing of its facticity. 82. 
Thus for Sartre all constitution rel~tes, unlike Kant, with others 
first and finally with relationship to my self, whereas Husserl would 
be inclined to give each equal stature. 
§ 25. Conclusion 
We have sketched out in some detail the methods and results of 
Husserl's account of the constitution of the alter-ego within the 
broader nexus of his theory of cognition. It is clear that insofar as 
we have laid out the mechanics of Husserl's account, and offered ob-
jections and alternatives to it, our discussion remains incomplete. 
For in all of this we have failed to ask ourselves what Husserl's gen-
uine intentions were in giving an account of transcendental intersub-
jectivity in the first place. It may turn out that while Husserl, in 
the exegesis of the development of his intersubjective theory, is culpa-
ble of some great errors, we may have missed the real importance of 
what he tried to do. 
We must first and foremost remember that Husserl was interested in 
transcendental phenomenology. We must also remember that, unlike both 
Ortega and Sartre, Husserl was operating within the phenomenologically 
reduced sphere, and not in the natural attitude. 
82 rb "d 460 
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The transcendental ega, i't will be recalled, is not a praperty 
af the warld; and the reducti'an to. the stream af cansciausness and the 
transcendental ego was intended to. pravide the canstituti'an af the 
manifestations via acts of cansciausness. As such it shauld be made 
clear that Husserl had no intentian of of.fering a'proof for the exis-
tence af athers. Rather he was interes.ted in the concept af meaning 
af the alter-ego, and" to give an account af the sarts af acts which 
, give rise to it. Moreaverl/ thi;s accaunt was far the expressed purpose 
af praviding a faundation for an objecti:vely vaHd world. The mativa-
tian far Husserl at the beginning of theCartesian'Meditatians was to 
show how objects are constituted intenti:anally with relatian to. the 
transcendental ego. The problem there ar.ose as to the status af ather 
egos for whom there are'also objects. 
It is our belief that part of the real importance af Husserl's 
investi'gatian was to indicate that transcendentallY the alter-ega does 
nat have the same kind of status as other material objects in so. far as 
they are given to. consci'ousness as synthetic unities. In fact the very 
meaning of appresentati'an'had to. be re-dealt with in terms af an irre-
deemable appresentation. It further turns out that the alter-ega has 
an even more fundamental status than that of matertal things, a status 
upon whi.ch material things in an objecti've world are unselbst8ndig. 
Thus i.t is not slmply a matter of consti:tuttng the alter-ega whi.ch is 
the issue here, rather it is the canstituti:on of the whale af the objec-
tive world. 
By way of final critici.s.m we may mentian that wi;th the effecting af 
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what we have referred to as the "secondary epoche ll the very meaning of 
IIconstitution" has shifted without explanation from its sense prior to 
i. ts invocation .. Previous to this second Ilbracketi ng" wi thi n the confines 
of the first it appears that Husserl's notion of constitution, which 
hither to had the connotation of an explication of sense within the re-
duced sphere had become a kind of search for a foundational structure of 
the being of the alter-ego. It occurs to us that this kind of search 
can only be conducted within the natural attitude and that transcendental 
phenomenology is in principle inc·apable of it. Such an analysis may 
well take the form of the Sartrian account, whereby, e.g., in the percep-
tion of the other we do not perceive a manifestation of the other!s anger 
in his clenched fi.st and tightened jaw, from which we may conclude the 
existence of a transcendent alter-ego, rather we perceive an angry other 
originaliter. Naturally, what we are suggesting is that two distinct 
types of intersubjective inquiry can be made. First, that of transcen-
dental intersubjectivity, the sense of which seemed to have escaped 
Husserl himself, and which should shed some light upon the conditi.ons 
for the possibil tty of the experience of the other· in terms of the ex-
pl ication of the sense of the world; and second~ mundane intersubjecti-
vity, which would be appropriate for the inquiry of the ontological 
status. of the other, and any abiding "proofs II for thei r existence whi ch 
may be found necessary to conduct. All thi.s is to say that if the sub-
ject of the other is given. then it has not the character of the trans-
cendental ego, we must appeal to the natural attitude to find it so. On 
the other hand, if the other is regarded as transcendental ego, he is in 
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princi.ple incapable of being given~ thus ontological questions tend to 
fall flat. 
It is our strong feel ing that Husserl found himself in the later 
phases of his lifeRs work in profound need of a constitutive analysis 
of transcendental intersubjectivity. To be sure, the very objectivity 
of the world, and therefore the foundati.on of his epistemological de-
liberations insist upon it. It seems a paradox that he should conduct 
this apparently preliminary investigation after the spelling out of, and 
in terms of, his epistemology. 
Probably one of the most annoying aspects of his examination of the 
transcendenta 1 sense of the a 1 ter-.ego is that it is conducted in the 
context of the occasion of the. other I S presence. The questi on of the 
coOoriginariness or non-co-originariness of intersubjectivity and objec-
tivity is somewhat controverted herein. Husserl, in order to provide an 
account of his intersubjective sense of objectivity, believes, we are 
told, that the alter-ego is given in experience some how,' but the problem 
is to show the other not as a mere worldly phenomenon, but as transcen-
dental ego. The further question arises here as to the plurality of 
transcendental egos. Is there only one, an Uego-at-largell which is com-
prised of IIfactual transcendentalego$"; and if so, to what extent are 
these two notions compossible? 
In fine, while Husserl may have failed here insofar .as his original 
projects are concerned~ viz., philosophy as a rigorous, apodictically 
. grounded sci.ence, it is clear that this failure was not due to any con-
sci.ous abandonment of these projects. Furthermore, Husserl's attempt at 
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the transcendental constitution of intersubjectivity by its very failure 
brings to the fore the exigency, nay, the necessity of further like work. 
Finally, it is our contention that the failure of the illumination of 
the founding strata of objectivity in no wise topples or invalidates the 
magnificent discoveries which Husserl made with such care and precision 
in the area of the theory of cognition. It would indeed be strange if 
the whole of the Ilpreparatory work of generations" could have been com-
pleted by Husserl himself. 
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